This essay presents and justifies a new empirical theory of modern fiduciary relations. Based on legal analysis, legal theories and the results of a new global survey of professional directors I recently conducted, Part II shows that fiduciary relationships are not fundamentally different from contractual relationships. The results of the survey show that trusted signs are very likely to replace the characteristics of the default law for trusts with alternative agreements and to indicate many rights and obligations of ex ante ex ante parties – exactly the behaviour traditionally called the characterization of contractual relationships. Trust underwriters are also likely to replace the characteristics of trust default law with other agreements, whether they have created the Trust by contract or by non-contractual means such as unilateral trust evidence and declarations of trust. Part III shows how the law and current practice do not share the view that the statutory trust obligations to fiduciary directors are stricter – and more strictly enforced – than those imposed on business leaders and senior executives. Trusts are converging with businesses through the terms of discharge and tariffs, which contain more and more instruments of trust, as well as legislative reform. The communication of fiduciary services, which transforms them from intimate, often long-term, relationships to anonymous and lengthy transactions, has resulted in fiduciary relationships in general and their traditionally different types increasingly resemble other social and economic relationships. Given that this realignment follows fiduciary relationships and expresses the social alienation and relational decomposition characteristic of today`s society, it will likely be difficult to reverse it. Only tough reform measures, such as legislative reform, which considers the concepts of fiduciary and unloading to be in vain, have some chance of success – and current consumer preferences should themselves hinder such drastic measures. If legal systems refer guardianship rights to its protective roots, administrators will likely charge premiums, and potential clients prefer cheaper, convenient, less protective options. Because of the financial responsibility of a trust, contractors should be careful about setting up a corporate trust contract, especially when selecting an agent.
The site USA.gov encourage fellows to introduce a “trust suppression clause” allowing the recipient to dismiss the agent if he or she is dissatisfied with the service.