On 21 June 1942, British and Commonwealth troops besieged the Libyan port of Tobruk under the command of Major General H.B. Klopper, who commanded the 2nd South African Division, surrendered the besieged forces of Field Marshal General Erwin Rommel, the German and Italian armoured army, and Rommel swept Mersa Matruh towards El Alamein in northwestern Egypt. Plans to disrupt or even separate vital but vulnerable lines of communication from the Axis powers by attacking the naval, port and fuel facilities of Tobruk and Benghazi, the latter further west around the Cyrenian coast, had been envisaged since the earlier withdrawal of British forces from Cyrenaica. Tactical planning for a series of attacks was therefore developed by the teams of the three British commanders-in-chief, whose chief marshal Sir Arthur Tedder refused the operation, as it would be impossible for his units to provide combat cover, but he nevertheless felt that he had to support what the other two commanders clearly wanted. In addition to the sinking of the warships, eight British and American aircraft were lost and the results of the operation were very disappointing and, combined with the other three partial operations, the main result was a general overhaul of the defence facilities on the lines of communication of the axis powers and the decision to strengthen Siwa, Jarabub and Jalo-Oasen. Three German second-line battalions were deployed to Sollum, and for a short period of time, the Generale di Divisione Nazzareno Scattaglias 17a Division `Pavia` was maintained at Mersa Matruh instead of being brought forward. The agreement of operation is a must not only for military historians, but also for military officers. It is mostly a warning story for military planners who provide a manual case on how not to plan and implement a successful combined operation. The attack on the Jalo oasis was carried out by the Sudan Defence Forces with the S1 and S2 patrols of the LRDG. The first attack, on the night of 15-16 September, was slightly repelled and intensified by the defenders who had been alerted to the operation. The attackers withdrew on 19 September, as a column of Italian reinforcements approached the oasis.  The objective of the operation agreement was to undermine the war efforts of the axis powers in North Africa by destroying airfields, port facilities, supply ships, vehicles and large oil depots.  The Allies also intended to conquer the Jalo oasis, which was to be used as a rendezvous for ground troops who were withdrawing and participating in other operations.
 Unlike the fictitious versions, this heist was not the whole story. It was part of a very complex operation involving an amphibious attack on Tobruk, carried out by units of the British Army and the Royal Navy, some of which were deployed by submarine. Similarly, most accounts do not have coordinated attacks by ground forces that have emerged from the desert to strike other enemy targets, including Benghazi.